A.J. Nolte, associate professor of politics at Regent University, remains unconvinced.
He believes the MOU is a bad deal, but the loser isn’t Israel, as many might believe. It’s the United States, Nolte said in an appearance on “Washington Watch” Thursday.
A 60-day window to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran is under way, and already there are pitfalls.
Vance on Friday postponed his trip to Geneva, Switzerland as scheduled talks were postponed or called off after renewed fighting between Israel and Iranian terror proxy Hezbollah. The MOU remains in effect.
President Donald Trump has said from the beginning that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon has been his primary objective.
The MOU indicates that Iran has agreed to dilute its highly enriched uranium under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
It appears to require that Iran halt expansion of its nuclear program, stop further enrichment beyond current levels, refrain from building nuclear weapons and negotiate long-term limits on enrichment activities.
If Iran hits certain markers along the way it receives oil-sanctions waivers, access to portions of its frozen assets, eventual lifting of broader U.S. and international sanctions and — if a final agreement is reached — potential economic assistance and reconstruction funding.
Nolte doesn’t like the MOU.
“Objectively it’s bad. It’s probably not as bad for Israel as some people are arguing. It’s much worse for the United States than people currently recognize,” he told show host Casey Harper.
The wording in the MOU actually gives Israel some leverage in negotiations, Nolte said.
Israel is not actually mentioned in the document which makes references to the U.S., Iran and their allies in a call to stop fighting on all fronts including Lebanon, the home base of Hezbollah, which also isn’t mentioned by name.
The agreement says the sovereignty of Lebanon must be respected.
“When we're talking about Lebanese sovereignty, per several U.N. resolutions, notably 1701 and agreements inside of Lebanon, all internal forces in Lebanon, militias, are supposed to throw down their arms and disarm. The Lebanese armed forces are supposed to be the only armed force inside of Lebanon. Hezbollah has been violating Lebanon's sovereignty since 1989,” Nolte said.
It’s a case Israel can and should make, Nolte said.
“If we're going to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, great, we'd love to negotiate with the government. But Hezbollah is not a sovereign entity. It is a militia that is in violation of multiple agreements to disarm.”
From the U.S. perspective, the deal’s similarities to Barack Obama’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ring alarm bells.
The JCPOA — signed by the U.S., Iran, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany and remaining members of the European Union — called for nuclear restrictions by Iran plus inspections for some sanctions relief.
“We’re doing a lot of upfront concessions for back-end promises, which is exactly the complaint that all of us had about the JCPOA. So, Trump runs the very strong risk of walking down the Obama road here, and he does not want to do that,” Nolte said.
Pay attention to Point Five
One perhaps overlooked point in these early days is the MOU’s language regarding the Strait of Hormuz.
“The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz,” Point Five of the MOU reads.
The prevailing view under the law of the sea is that the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait connecting two bodies of international waters.
Ships and aircraft enjoy a right of transit passage — continuous and unobstructed movement through the Strait. Most maritime-law experts consider this right to be part of customary international law and not something that Iran or Oman can simply suspend.
“It says in the MOU that Iran will negotiate with Oman and other literal states, states that border the Strait of Hormuz, for the final disposition of the Strait,” Nolte explained.
The repercussions could be massive.
“The United States Navy has been predicated on the idea of free navigation of the seas, meaning nobody gets to toll, nobody gets to decide who goes through and who doesn't go through strategic waterways. So, if we are actually going to cede that permission and change that doctrine in an MOU with Iran, that has huge implications for China, that has huge implications for things like the Panama Canal,” Nolte said.
It’s important to note that the MOU does not begin a ceasefire.
Though it often seemed wobbly at best, the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran actually began on April 7 following the beginning of the conflict on Feb. 28.
The old playbook
Iran has had more than two months to recover from those brutal early attacks and reset itself militarily.
That would stretch to four months by the end of the 60-day window, four months of pondering and plotting for a government whose trustworthiness is frequently questioned.
What if the Islamic Regime, wounded, fewer in number but still in power, decides the deal isn’t worth it’s time? What if Iran decides to employ the old and familiar strategy of playing for time?
“I would say that's absolutely what they're doing,” Nolte said.
